

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AFRICAN COMMAND – THE NEWEST
COMBATANT COMMAND

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ABSTRACT

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African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command System. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) currently divides the Continent of Africa into areas of responsibility served by European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. This current division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of "seams" between the current combatant command boundaries. EUCOM's focus is based on their expansion into the newest NATO countries on their Eastern border. CENTCOM's focus for the indefinite future is on OEF, OIF, and the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East. PACOM's focus has been and remains on the Asian continent. For these and other reasons that will be further developed the UCP must establish AFRICOM as its Combatant Command Headquarters on the African continent.

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AFRICAN COMMAND – THE NEWEST COMBATANT COMMAND

Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

- President George W. Bush

United States African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) system. The UCP currently divides Africa into areas of responsibility (AOR) served by United States European Command (EUCOM), United States Central Command (CENTCOM), and United States Pacific Command (PACOM). The division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of seams between the current combatant command boundaries. These seams potentially have been and undoubtedly will be used by terrorists and other criminal elements to avoid detection from U.S. efforts to track and apprehend them.

In light of the above, this research paper will address the current United States National Security and National Military Strategy toward Africa. This paper will then look at an on-going strategically important event in Africa, the crisis in Sudan, and see how the United States is attempting to handle the crisis based on our perceived national interests in that region of Africa. This paper will conclude with recommendations for a new U.S. National Security and National Military strategic approach toward the continent of Africa.

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN:

The Unified Command Plan was established, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1946. "Following the experience of global warfare in World War II, the Services recognized the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of US forces. Generally, over the next 50 years, the Unified Command Plan did adapt to the changing strategic environment and to great advances in technology, particularly the growing global reach of US forces."¹

According to the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF – Joint Pub 0-2) a Unified Command "is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander, is composed of forces from two or more Military departments, and is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."² Unified Commands are also called Unified Combatant Commands.

EUCOM's present focus is on their expansion into the newest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries on the Eastern border of the EUCOM AOR. CENTCOM's focus for the indefinite future is on fighting the global war on terrorism and specifically on conducting Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF), as well as balancing the future U.S. military presence in the CENTCOM AOR. PACOM's current focus remains on the Asian continent and on the continuing threat of Islamic extremism anchored in the Philippines and recently spreading throughout the Southeast Asian region. Because of this disjointed current situation, and its long term implications, the UCP must be redrawn to establish AFRICOM as the sole Combatant Command Headquarters for Africa.

Under the current UCP, EUCOM's AOR, in addition to every country in Europe and Israel, includes every country on the continent of Africa except Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya (which are in CENTCOM's AOR) and Madagascar (which is in PACOM's AOR).

Joint Vision 2020, published in June 2000, stated that,

The ultimate goal of our military force is to accomplish the objectives directed by the National Command Authorities. For the joint force of the future, this goal will be achieved through full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations...The full range of operations includes maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence. It includes theater engagement and presence activities...It also include those ambiguous situations residing between peace and war, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as noncombatant humanitarian relief operations...³

The “ultimate goal” of *Joint Vision 2020* will be extremely difficult to achieve on the African continent as long as the United States continues to divide Africa between three Combatant Commanders, who each have their own theater priorities within their AORs. These “theater priorities” seldom focus on Africa until a critical situation has reached a crisis proportion. Crises such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and starvation in Somalia in 1993-1994, serve as reminders that the United States seldom acts in Africa until it is forced to do so by public pressure, the CNN effect, or a United Nations mandate. The on-going crisis in Sudan, discussed at the end of this paper, serves as another example.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, stated in the 30 Sep 2001, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (which was largely written prior to the “911” attacks) that Key Geopolitical Trends include “*Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states*. The absence of capable or responsible governments in many countries in wide areas of Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere creates a fertile ground for non-state actors engaging

in drug trafficking, terrorism, and other activities that spread across borders."⁴ The Saharan Desert region of Northern Africa, including Mauritania, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Libya, Chad, Egypt, and the Sudan, presents an outstanding opportunity for lawlessness on the part of drug traffickers and terrorists or as an opportunity for the United States to establish a military presence to promote regional leadership in this largely ungoverned terrain.

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report continues on the same theme by stating that,

In several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies, safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving as sanctuary to terrorists and criminal organizations can also pose a threat to stability and place demands on U.S. forces. Conditions in some states...demonstrate that potential threats can grow out of the weakness of governments as much as out of their strength.⁵

The financial cost of establishing a long-term African military presence, in the form of a new Combatant Command Headquarters, with Component Commands, for Africa will be prohibitively high in the short-term. The larger U.S. issue, in the long-term, is what will be the cost of continuing to apply band-aid solutions to issues as they arise in Africa? Washington must be prepared to deal with the new realities in Africa which include the global war on terrorism, the increasing number of failed states that often lead to acts of genocide, and an AIDS epidemic, all of which when taken together rise to the level of a vital national interest of the United States. As Secretary Rumsfeld succinctly stated, "The United States cannot retreat from the world. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends."⁶

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States articulates President George W. Bush's security vision for U.S. presence and interaction around the world. The NSS presents several African issues and initiatives to address those issues. On the opening page of the NSS President Bush states, "In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."⁷

Addressing troubled regions of the world, such as Africa, the NSS offers new initiatives and renewed efforts to existing problems to reinforce the point that the U.S. will remain engaged and not neglect its global responsibilities. "The United States will deliver greater development assistance through the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly, invest

in their people, and encourage economic freedom. We will also continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.”⁸

The NSS focuses on the global war on terrorism and recognizes that terrorist cells are located throughout the world and that the U.S. must locate those cells in order to destroy them. “Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia. Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”⁹ The seams that have been created in Africa between the three Combatant Commands make a coordinated effort against terrorist cells more difficult. The seeds of terrorism must be recognized. Washington must wage a war of ideas with those who support terrorists and their causes in the unstable areas of Africa. America must support moderate governments, especially in the Muslim regions of Africa, so that they can educate their populations before terrorist elements gain a foothold with their youth.¹⁰

When focusing on regional conflicts, the NSS states, “When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability. No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action – direct or indirect – is warranted. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities.”¹¹ This appears to be a reactive strategy, at least in the case of Africa, where the U.S. will intervene after violence erupts and states falter. The U.S., like every nation, has finite resources, but if Washington becomes proactive in its strategic approach to Africa, it could save those resources in the long-run. We must break the current cycle in Africa if the United States is going to truly support its interests, values, and principles.

In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.¹²

The NSS addresses the opening of new societies by stating that we will help those countries that are clearly attempting to help themselves. “The Millennium Challenge Account will reward countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those that have not to implement reforms.”¹³ Focusing on education, “The United States will increase its own funding for education assistance by at least 20 percent with an emphasis on improving basic

education and teacher training in Africa. The United States can also bring information technology to these societies, many of whose education systems have been devastated by HIV/AIDS.”¹⁴ If prudently invested, this policy will pay dividends by using education as the basic building block to create stable governments that are economically interdependent both regionally and globally. The important question becomes does the U.S., and willing western partners, have enough resources and sufficient time to allow this type of new approach to succeed?

The NSS recognizes that Washington requires bases and stations around the globe. “To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”¹⁵ Establishing AFRICOM as a Combatant Command in Africa would not only provide long-term bases and stations for the U.S. but would also acknowledge that the U.S. understands the strategic significance of Africa. U.S. diplomats would also benefit from the establishment of AFRICOM. “Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes.”¹⁶ With the establishment of AFRICOM, and with U.S. forces forward deployed to AFRICOM Component Command bases throughout Africa, the ability of diplomats to conduct their jobs would be greatly enhanced.

THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States conveys the opinion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers. His message to the Joint Force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States stated that we should support the National Security and Defense Strategies in this time of war.¹⁷ Further, General Myers stated,

The NMS serves to focus the Armed Forces on maintaining US leadership in a global community that is challenged on many fronts – from countering the threat of global terrorism to fostering emerging democracies. In this environment, US presence and commitment to partners are essential. Our armed forces, operating at home and abroad, in peace and war, will continue to serve as a constant, visible reminder of US resolve to protect common interests.¹⁸

There are problem areas throughout the world. The U.S. has limited resources (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) that can be used to address potential and actual problems presented in those areas. The NMS recognizes that,

There exists an “arc of instability” stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in

this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists.¹⁹

Africa has rogue states, vast ungoverned space and under-governed territories that cannot be watched, on a daily basis, from EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM headquarters. The establishment of AFRICOM will allow a dedicated Combatant Commander to work the intricate military issues and support the diplomatic processes of this long forgotten continent. The NMS describes what could and should be accomplished when,

Combatant commanders, employing a mix of forward stationed, rotational and temporarily deployed capabilities tailored to perform specific missions, improve our ability to act within and across borders, strengthen the role of partners and expand joint and multinational capabilities. Posture and presence enhancements also serve to assure our friends; improve the ability to prosecute the WOT; deter, dissuade and defeat other threats; and support transformation. These changes, developed in anticipation of future threats, help to ensure strategic access to key regions and lines of communications critical to US security and sustaining operations throughout the battlespace.²⁰

In his NMS conclusion General Myers states, "To succeed, the Armed Forces must integrate Service capabilities in new and innovative [*sic*], reduce seams between combatant commands and develop more collaborative relationships with partners at home and abroad."²¹ So much more could be accomplished in Africa if the U.S. and our allies would work together with a long-term strategic vision instead of reacting to events on a crisis-by-crisis basis.

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

Today USEUCOM has 90 countries and territories in its AOR. That AOR includes every country in Europe, Israel, and every country on the continent of Africa except Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Madagascar.²²

In regards to U.S. military involvement in Africa, General James Jones (USMC), Commander of U.S. European Command stated, "Expanding U.S. military presence on the African continent could help local armies fight terrorism by fostering more regional cooperation."²³ A program called the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) is underway in sub-Saharan Africa, with Special Operations Command Europe forces working in Mali and Mauritania and Marines working in Chad and Niger training and equipping company-sized units for border defense and counterterrorism.²⁴

The missions envisioned by General Jones have two purposes. First, the training would help other nationals trying to protect their own borders, including fighting drug and arms smuggling. Second, it would give the U.S. increased visibility as it fights to keep terrorist organizations from taking root in struggling democracies. General Jones hopes other countries will join the United States in shouldering the burden in this new front on the war on terrorism. Jones added that the key to such programs is that nations can strike at terrorism before terrorism can prosper.²⁵ EUCOM's military engagement plan in Africa currently involves only countries in North Africa and has no corresponding linkage to the CENTCOM based African countries that share the same inherent problems that the PSI countries have.

Removing the 42 African countries currently in EUCOM, and placing them into AFRICOM, would leave the EUCOM AOR with 48 countries and territories in Europe and with Israel in the Middle East. This change would allow EUCOM to focus on the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, as well as the current downsizing of U.S. forces based in Europe.

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Today CENTCOM's AOR includes 27 culturally and economically diverse nations located in the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, and the Northern Red Sea regions, as well as the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.²⁶

The CENTCOM countries in or near the Horn of Africa area are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. The region borders the critical sea lines of communication through the Red Sea. Famine, drought, and disease ravage the region, and civil wars in most of these countries have further exacerbated the problems.²⁷

Removing seven African countries from CENTCOM would leave the CENTCOM AOR with 20 countries. This change would allow CENTCOM to remain focused on their combat operations in support of OIF and OEF, and on the future presence of the U.S. in the Middle East, and in Central and South Asia.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Today PACOM's AOR includes 44 Asian-Pacific countries and entities. The AOR stretches from the islands of the South Pacific, through Australia and Micronesia, to India, China, Mongolia, and Japan.²⁸ The PACOM AOR also includes Madagascar, located less than 300 miles east of Mozambique, which sits on the far western end of the PACOM AOR and approximately two thousand miles from its nearest PACOM neighbor.

Removing Madagascar from PACOM would leave the PACOM AOR with 43 Asia-Pacific countries and entities. This change would allow PACOM to remain focused on the Asian

continent and on the increasing threat of Islamic extremism anchored in the Philippines and currently spreading throughout the Southeast Asia-Pacific region.

AFRICA TODAY

Africa today is a continent that remains rooted in the 19th century while being on the verge of entering the 21st century. It is a complex continent defined by increasing resources, new lines of communication between itself and the rest of the world, and an expanding economic co-dependence, yet Africa also has an evolving terror infrastructure, is a provider of instability into Europe by way of refugees, human trafficking, and smuggling, and Africa has a continental AIDS epidemic that is both catastrophic, expanding, and invisible at the same time.

Africa today remains a continent seemingly cut-off from the rest of the world and ignored until a major humanitarian crisis or terrorist attack brings its misery to the evening news. Since the end of the African colonial era, in the early 1960s, countries in Africa have been forced to live within their western imposed national boundaries while attempting to live a tribal, nomadic, lifestyle throughout huge areas of the African continental land mass.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, in his article *The Pentagon's New Map*, stated,

Show me a part of the world that is secure in its peace and I will show you strong or growing ties between local militaries and the U.S. military. Show me regions where major war is inconceivable and I will show you permanent U.S. military bases and long-term security alliances. Show me the two strongest investment relationships in the global economy and I will show you two postwar military occupations that remade Europe and Japan following World War II.²⁹

What Africa lacks today is a continental wide stabilizing mechanism. Although there have been several attempts to create regional organizations within Africa, such as the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) or the African Union (AU), they have by and large been marginalized by a lack of consistent support from the developed world. The United Nations (UN) attempts to address immediate concerns when they arise throughout Africa, but like the regional organizations, the UN has been unable to bring the world together to address the long-term issues that are required to move Africa toward a peaceful future. In their book *Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross state, "The UN remains a weak institution. Though it has been remarkably busy at peacekeeping over the last five or six years, it has proven ineffectual wherever the local parties have been even moderately resistant. Regional institutions did not do much better."³⁰

The State Departments Bureau of African Affairs released the following information concerning ECOWAS on 22 Nov 2002;

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) that was founded by treaty in May 1975. ECOWAS was conceived as a means toward economic integration and development intended to lead to the eventual establishment of an economic union in West Africa, enhancing economic stability and enhancing relations between member states... Political instability has hindered progress in ECOWAS' primary mandate to promote economic integration and regional cooperation.³¹

The AU was established in 1999. The AU was essentially a reorganization of the former Organization of African Unity. As published on the AU website, the following are a few objectives of the AU:

- (1) To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- (2) To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- (3) To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (4) To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
- (5) To promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- (6) To work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.³²

Both ECOWAS and the AU have used their organization's resources several times, since they were established, to intervene in regional crises. The UN has attempted to channel international resources into these organizations so that Africans can attempt to solve their own problems. Corruption and greed seem to follow these interventions as soon as international support or oversight is withdrawn.

President Bush proposed, in his address to the UN General Assembly, on 21 September 2004, that an attempt be made to create an African military organization that would be used by Africans to help Africans. He proposed that,

Because we believe in human dignity, the world must have more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing. We must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises. The United States and Italy have proposed a Global Peace Operations Initiative. G-8

countries will train 75,000 peacekeepers, initially from Africa, so they can conduct operations on that continent and elsewhere. The countries of the G-8 will help this peacekeeping force with deployment and logistical needs.³³

African problems are deep and intertwined. National economic instability, throughout the majority of countries in Africa, provides the breeding ground for political, military, and religious instability which ultimately has provided the welcome mat to terrorist. Ellen Frost, in her article, "Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Agenda" noted,

International and regional comparisons are particularly relevant to U.S. foreign policy and security strategy. To revert to the standard measurement, the gap between the per capita GDP of one nation or region and that of other nations and regions has been growing. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, per capita GDP in the 1990s is about the same as it was in the 1960s, while in every other region it has grown. African population growth has swelled the numbers of impoverished people by another 30 million. Africa's share of international trade has declined, while its indebtedness is the highest in the world.³⁴

GDP, trade, population growth and other metrics used to evaluate – in western terms – the situation in Africa seem to be pointing in the wrong direction. Perhaps the most important measurement and potentially the most disastrous to the rest of the world is the AIDS/HIV epidemic on-going in Africa. Rock star Bono in an interview with Bill O'Reilly, on 01 Sep 2004, noted,

It's an emergency. 69,000 Africans dying every day of a preventable, treatable disease...I'm not asking drug companies to behave like philanthropists. I'm saying we, our governments, United States and Europe, have to deal with this problem. If we don't, we will reap a very ill wind. This is – it's not just being bleeding hearts here. The strategic implications. There's 10 million AIDS orphans in Africa right now. There will be 20 by the end of the decade. 12 right now. This is chaos. This is consummating (ph) havoc, and the war against terror, which you talk about every night, is bound up in the war against poverty. I didn't say that. Colin Powell said that.³⁵

A 2004 map of Africa pictorially displays 50 countries. Several of these countries are no more than failed states or states on the verge of collapse. African regional organizations are at best in their infancy. Power is held by war lords, autocrats, tribal chiefs, and dictators. Democracy has taken root in very few countries. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in his book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, articulately observes,

Power today is less tangible and less coercive among the advanced democracies than it was in the past. At the same time, much of the world does not consist of advanced democracies, and that limits the global transformation of power. For example, most African and the Middle Eastern countries have preindustrial

agricultural economies, weak institutions, and authoritarian rulers. Failed states such as Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia provide venues for violence.³⁶

Along with failed and impoverished states, Africa is also a continent which has vast spaces, many of which are extremely harsh and desolate. These failed states and ungoverned areas present breeding grounds for criminals and terrorist alike. Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, the head of military transformation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, noted in 2003,

The absence of capable or responsible governments in many countries in wide areas of Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere creates a fertile ground for non-state actors to engage in terrorism, acquisition of CBRN weapons, illegal drug trafficking, and other illicit activities across state borders...In an era of catastrophic terrorism, the United States cannot afford to ignore the anarchy that threatens a number of regions of the world.³⁷

Additionally, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the DIA, stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26 Feb 2004, in regards to threats to the United States that,

We are also increasingly concerned over "Ungoverned Spaces," defined as geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective control. Terrorist groups and narcotraffickers use these areas as sanctuaries to train, plan and organize, relatively free from interference. There are numerous "Ungoverned Spaces" around the world such as... several areas in Africa...Ungoverned spaces include densely populated cities where terrorists can congregate and prepare for operations with relative impunity. I believe these areas will play an increasingly important role in the War on Terrorism as al-Qaida, its associated groups and other terrorist organizations use these areas as bases for operations.³⁸

In the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, published in February 2003, President Bush addressed both ungoverned territory as well as weak and failing states,

The United States will work in concert with our international and regional partners to ensure effective governance over ungoverned territory, which could provide sanctuary to terrorists. Where there is a clear indication of terrorist activity in these areas, the United States, in conjunction with our friends and allies, will work to eliminate these terrorist sanctuaries and preclude any future access to these areas by terrorist organizations... Weak states and failed ones are a source of international instability. Often, these states may become a sanctuary for terrorism...The principal objective of our collective response will be the rebuilding of a state that can look after its own people – their welfare, health, prosperity, and freedom – and control its borders.³⁹

THE CRISIS IN SUDAN

Within the last two months, the on-going 21-year-old civil war in southern Sudan, which has displaced more than 4 million people from their homes and claimed the lives of an

estimated 2 million more, has finally been brought to the world's attention.⁴⁰ "It is genocide. I've seen it with my own eyes," said Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. "If this were taking place in southern France or western Germany, the world would be electrified."⁴¹

On 12 August 2004, the President of Sudan, Lt. Gen. Omar Ahmad al-Bashir, stated, "We are, truthfully, capable of providing security for the Sudani citizen and we are not willing to accept any foreign forces because honestly, foreign forces will only complicate the situation."⁴² For years, nations have turned a blind eye on the situation in Sudan due to the sovereignty of Sudan.

On 01 September 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the Security Council that the Sudanese government had not done enough to provide security for the 1.2 million "terrorized and traumatized" people displaced by the violence, which may lead to additional sanctions against Sudan.⁴³ U.S. Secretary of State Powell stated, "We concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed (Arab militias) bear responsibility -- and genocide may still be occurring," Powell added that as a contracting party to an international genocide convention, Sudan is obliged to prevent and punish acts of genocide.⁴⁴

President Bush, in his 30 September 2004 presidential debate with Senator Kerry, in reference to the crisis in Sudan stated,

We ought to be working with the African Union to do so -- precisely what we did in Liberia. We helped stabilize the situation with some troops, and when the African Union came, we moved them out. My hope is that the African Union moves rapidly to help save lives. And fortunately the rainy season will be ending shortly, which will make it easier to get aid there and help the long-suffering people there.⁴⁵

Under the current UCP, Sudan is located in CENTCOM's AOR, while Chad, which is located on the western border of Sudan, is in EUCOM's AOR. The Darfur region of Sudan sits astride those two countries' borders. If AFRICOM was established this inter-Combatant Command seam would be eliminated and U.S. efforts, both diplomatic and military, could have been brought to bear on this crisis before several million people had been displaced and over 50,000 had been killed.

JUSTIFICATION AND RECOMMENDATION

The research conducted for this paper clearly indicates that the United States has avoided direct involvement in Africa for far too long. Washington puts at risk its long-term security, and prestige as the world's sole remaining super power if it does not become directly involved in

helping to lead Africa into the 21st century. The United States, working with other partners in the world, should establish a “Marshall Plan” for Africa. The U.S. portion of the plan should be centered on the establishment of a new Combatant Command for Africa.

In order for the United States to have a more effective and credible NSS and NMS, toward the Continent of Africa, it must establish a long-term military presence that will serve to lead the countries of Africa toward a more stable future. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) should direct the establishment of AFRICOM, as the newest Combatant Command within the UCP, with an AOR that encompasses the 50 countries in Africa. The SECDEF should also direct the establishment of AFRICOM Component Commands by the United States Army, United States Marine Corps and the establishment of a sub-unified command, to AFRICOM, by the United States Special Operations Command. The SECDEF should further direct the United States Air Force and the United States Navy to conduct and submit feasibility studies pertaining to the necessity of their services establishing Component Commands within AFRICOM.

The division of Africa, within the current UCP, has led to the creation of seams between the three combatant command boundaries. These seams potentially have been and will continue to be used by terrorists, rogue states, and other criminal elements to avoid detection from the United States efforts to track and apprehend them.

CONCLUSION

If the United States does not act now to create a single Combatant Command for the entire continent of Africa it risks both short and long-term effects. The effects may currently be peripheral interests, but may become vital national interests of the United States within the next 10 to 20 years. The United States has to weigh the cost of establishing AFRICOM, and its potential forward deployed Component Commands which could be located throughout the length and breadth of Africa, against the cost of maintaining the status quo in the short-term and the potential for continued humanitarian crises, the spread of terrorism, and an economic implosion of the African continent in the long-term.

The United States is the single remaining super power in the world. If Washington wants to retain its economic and military leadership throughout the world, it must become more actively involved on the African continent. The best way of showing the world that it is totally committed to Africa is by establishing African Command as the sole Combatant Command for the Continent of Africa.

WORD COUNT=5,656

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